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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988 Supp.)-

1

STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This appeal is from a final Judgment and Order of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated
December 23, 1988.

A copy of said Judgment is attached hereto.

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

WERE THE BRADSHAWS BONA FIDE PURCHASERS UNDER
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE CUT
OFF THE RIGHT TO REFORM THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE GRAHNS AND THE TRUST?
WAS THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BRADSHAWS AND
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRACTORIES ENFORCEABLE AND
WAS THE INJUNCTION WRONGFUL AND WERE THE
BRADSHAWS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES?

3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES

There are no determinative

constitutional provisions,

statutes, ordinances, or rules which these defendants/appellants
cite in their brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW

Defendants appeal from the judgment entered in the Third
Judicial District Court on December 23, 1988 by the Honorable
John A. Rokich.
property.

The case is a dispute about the sale of real

The court below ordered

specific performance and

reformation of the contract for sale of Parcel 1 to include the
Private Drive and ordered that the Grahns pay an additional sum
for the additional acreage.

(See Judgment and Order, Record, p.

543, a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum.)

B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

These Appellants adopt by reference those facts contained in
the

brief

of

Appellant

Gregory,

and

submit

the

following

additional facts.
47.
contract

In July of 1986 Defendant Dean Bradshaw entered into a
with

Rocky Mountain

Refractories, through

its vice

president Craig Ostler to provide a special insulated aggregate
to be used with concrete, and services to be used in the home
designed

by

Bradshaw

to be constructed

upon Parcel

2.

(See

Transcript, p. 486-491)
48.

Craig

Ostler

valued

the

aggregate

to

$12,500.00 to $15,000.00. (See Transcript, p. 486-491)
5

be

worth

49.

As

a condition

precedent

to

supplying

the

materials

Bradshaw had to be the first individual in the area to use this
specialized material so that the home could be used in research
and as a model to market the new material • (See Transcript, p.
486-491)
As a direct result of Grahns1 actions in bringing this

50.
lawsuit

and

Bradshaws

were

individuals

Bradshaws1

enjoining

to

unable
use

to

the

begin

construction
construction

aggregate

and

Mountain Refractories agreed to provide.

6

of

their

home,

and be the

first

engineering

which

Pccky

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bradshaws

entered

into

an

purchase Parcel 2 from Gregory.
on McNeil's

Earnest

Money

Agreement

to

At that time, Bradshaws relied

survey which showed the metes and bounds legal

description of Parcel 2.

At the time they entered into the

agreement, Bradshaws had no notice, actual or constructive, that
a portion of the Private Drive was located on their parcel.

As

such, Bradshaws were bona fide purchasers of Parcel 2 and they
would be prejudiced by reformation of the sale of Parcel 1 which
includes acreage originally part of Parcel

2, and therefore

Bradshaws cut off any right Grahns had to reformation of their
Agreement to purchase Parcel 1.
Grahns

had

injunction

to
the

an

easement

court

issued

Bradshaws also cut off any right

along
is

the

Private

therefore

Drive.

wrongful

and

The
the

Bradshaws are entitled to damages as a result of the wrongful
injunction and inability to perform under their contract with
Rocky Mountain refractories.

7

ARGUMENT

These

Appellants

adopt

by

reference

the Argument

in

its

entirety contained in the brief of Appellant Gregory, and submit
the following additional Argument.
POINT I.

BRADSHAWS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS AND WHOSE
RIGHTS ARE PREJUDICED BY REFORMATION AND THEREFORE
CUT OFF THE GRAHNSf RIGHT OF REFORMATION.
A.

ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO QUALIFY
AS BONA FIDE PURCHASER

In the case of Hettinger v. Jensen,
1984),

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

684 P.2d

established

establishing bona fide purchaser status.

the

1271

(Utah

standard

for

The Court held that one

must be a purchaser for value without notice of the mistake and
as a

result

cut

off

the

right

to

reformation.

In

order

to

qualify as a bona fide purchaser, the party must not have either
actual or constructive notice of the other party's interest in
the property.
The Utah Supreme Court in Blodgett

v. Martsch, 590 P. 2d

298 (Utah 1978), defined a "bona fide purchaser" as one who takes
property without actual or constructive knowledge of facts which
are sufficient to put him on notice of the complainant's equity.
In Utah Farm Production Credit v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant
Grove, 734 P.2d

904

(Utah 1986)

(footnote 2 ) , the Utah Supreme

Court stated:

Actual or c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e defeats
subsequent
purchaser's
interest.
8

a
A

subsequent purchaser must therefore show that
he had no actual notice, i.e., no personal
knowledge, of a prior conveyance or that the
prior conveyance did not impart constructive
notice, i.e., was not recorded before his
conveyance in the same land was recorded.
Id. at 906.
In 1987, this court held that if a subsequent purchaser has
information

or

facts which would

put a prudent person upon

inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to
the state of the title, then an unrecorded conveyance is not void
as against that subsequent purchaser.

Diversified Equities, Inc.

v. American Savings and Loan Associationf

739 P.2d 1133 (Utah

1987)

B.
At

the

Agreement

to

description

BRADSHAWS DID NOT HAV|B
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

time

Bradshaws

purchase
prepared

entered

Parcel
by

2,

into

they

Defendant

the

relied

McNeil

in

Earnest

Money

on

legal

the

his

survey.

According to the survey the Private Drive was located on Parcel
1.

However,

Defendant

Bradshaw

later

discovered

through

measuring Parcel 2 that a portion of the driveway was actually
located on Parcel 2.
deed

Gregory

dimensions.

gave

According to the legal description on the

Bradshaws, they

had

a

lot with

specific

They were not concerned about the road as long as

they had adequate space on which to build the home they had
designed.

Bradshaws did not have notice of an overlapping

description because there was no overlap in the descriptions of
9

Parcel 1 and 2 according to the respective deeds.
The

deed

descriptions

property were correct.
Private

Drive

as

with

respect

to

the

size

of

each

The surveyor had intended to show the

the

boundary

but

had

made

a

mistake.

Defendants Rradshaw could not have had constructive notice that
Plaintiff

had

any

ownership

interest

in

the

land

he

was

purchasing.

C.

BRADSHAWS DID NOT HAVE
ACTUAL NOTICE

Since the mistake did not affect the size of the property,
Defendant Bradshaw had no reason to believe that it would affect
his title.

In Diversified, supra., the Court stated that if the

subsequent purchaser had notice of information that would put a
prudent

person

upon

inquiry

which,

if pursued, would

lead tc

actual knowledge, that purchaser could not qualify as a bona fide
purchaser.
At the time Defendant Bradshaw entered into his contrac:
to purchase Parcel 2, he was unaware of any mistake at all.

I*:

is undeniable that he was a bona fide purchaser without notice a:
that time.

He later learned of the mistake which the surveyor

had made regarding the Private Drive, but did not have any reascr
to believe it would affect his title to Parcel 2.

At the time he

closed on Parcel 2, he understood the dispute to be between tn:
Gregorys
Grahns

and

Grahns.

a driveway

on

He

knew

their

the Gregorys

property.

had

promised

He was aware

tr/

that. th3

problem could be solved by the Gregorys building a new driveway
10

on the Grahns' property.
The Grahns actually had no ownership interest in any part of
Parcel

2 until

the trial

court gave them that

interest by

ordering reformation of the Grahns1 deed to include the land that
contained the Private Drive.
D.

BRADSHAWS' STATUS AS A
BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE
WITHOUT NOTICE CUTS OFF ANY RIGHT
OF REFORMATION

The Utah Supreme Court in Hottinaer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271
(Utah 1984) held that the right of reformation of a deed can be
cut off by the purchase of property by a bona fide purchaser for
value

without

notice.

Hottinger

was

a

case

in which

the

Defendant and her husband in 1958 conveyed all of a parcel of
land, except that portion which comprised their home, yard, and
garden to a Mr. and Mrs. Jones with the understanding that the
boundary

line was an existing fence.

conveyed the land to the Plaintiffs.

In 1978, the Joneses
Plaintiffs took the land

with the same understanding that the fence was the boundary.
However, in 1980, they obtained a survey and found out that the
boundary actually extended into the Defendant's yard and garden.
Upon discovering

this, Plaintiffs asserted ownership of that

portion of Defendant's property in dispute and filed a lawsuit to
quiet title.

Defendants counterclaimed, seeking reformation of

the deed to conform to the originally understood boundary.

The

Plaintiffs asserted that they were bona fide purchasers and would
therefore cut off Defendant's right of reformation.
11

While the

Court did hold that the right of reformation is cut off by bona
fide purchasers

for value without notice, the Court also h^ld

that

did

Plaintiffs

not

meet

the

bona

fide

purchaser

status

because they had constructive notice of the Defendant's interest
in the land - there being an overlap in the deeds.
In the instant case, Defendants Bradshaw did not have any
notice of the Grahns interest in Parcel 2 since Grahns did not
acquire that interest until the trial court gave it to them by
ordering

reformation

of

their

deed

containing the Private Drive.

to

include

the

property

Bradshaws believed, as did the

other parties, the road was the boundary but they were concerned
only

with

the

metes

and

bounds

description

which

gave

then

sufficient ground on which to build the home they had designed.
When the Bradshaws entered into the Earnest Money Agreement
to purchase Parcel 1, that was a binding contract and failure to
close

would

contract.
Lach v.

be

a

failure

to

perform

under

See Allen v. Kinadon, 723 P.2d
Desert

difference

Bank,

that

the

746

P.2d

closing

802

took

(Utah

place

the

394

terms

of

the

(Utah 1986) and

1987).

It made

nc

after the parties ha:;

found problems regarding the descriptions.

The Bradshaws' bona

fide status arose in September when they contracted to buy Parcel
2.
E.

Reformation
used

in an

REFORMATION IS IMPROPER WHERE
RIGHTS AS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER
WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED
is an equitable

inequitable way.

remedy

The Court
12

which

the trial

injured

court

the rignts

c:

Gregory, and the Bradshaws by ordering reformation of the sale of
Parcel 1.

Doctrine of equity should only be used to accomplish

equitable results.

Reformation of the Grahns contract works an

inequitable result of taking away the bargain of an innocent
purchaser.

In the case of Bailey v. Ewing, 671 P.2d 1099 (Idaho

App. 1983), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that "reformation
will not be granted if it appears such relief will prejudice the
rights of bona fide and innocent purchasers.
Bailey was a case that involved a boundary dispute between
the purchasers of adjoining lots.

The Personal Representative of

the decedent owner of the property had the property divided into
two parcels which were referred to as "Lot 5" and "Lot 6".
was a house on Lot 5.
1977 to Ewing.

There

Lot 5 was sold at auction on October 1,

A week later, Lot 6 was sold to Bailey, who had

attended the auction.

The Personal Representative had told both

men that he believed the boundary between the two parcels to be
located approximately at some lilac bushes located about 13 feet
east of the house.

He also indicated that he did not know for

sure where the boundary line was located.

Both men purchased the

respective lots on the assumption that the boundary was the lilac
bushes.

The boundary was later discovered to be less than one

foot east of the base of the house, the vertical plane of the
boundary passing through the eves of the house.
and Bailey brought a quiet title action.
for Bailey, and Ewing appealed.
Appeals stated:
13

A dispute ensued

The trial court found

On appeal, the Idaho Court of

It is undeniable that if the personal
representative had not sold Lot 6, but had
merely sold Lot 5 to Ewing, the deed to Ewing
could be reformed.
Only the rights of the
estate and Ewing would be affected. However,
Erhardt
sold
Lot 6 to Bailey, thereby
involving a third party. Any reformation of
Ewing f s deed adding land to Lot 5 must result
necessarily in reformation of Bailey's deed
subtracting land from Lot 6. ... The question
becomes whether Bailey was a bona fide
purchaser without notice.
... If Bailey was
not a bona fide purchaser, then Ewing may
obtain relief by having both deeds reformed
in accordance with the parties1 intentions.
However, if Bailey is found to be a bona fide
purchaser then reformation can be decreed
only if some way is found for Bailey
to be
satisfactorily and fully compensated.
Id at 1104.
In the case at hand, Gregory did not just sell Parcel 1.
sold Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.

He

Defendant Bradshaw purchased Parcel

2 as a bona fide purchaser.

Reformation then could only be a

proper

if

remedy

in

this

case

Defendant

Bradshaw

could

be

satisfactorily and fully compensated.
There was no other property in the Salt Lake Valley which
Defendant
unique.

Bradshaw

could

find

to fit his needs.

The land

is

He needed at least one-half acre to build his home on

the property. When he found out about the mistake the surveyor
had made in locating the Private Drive on the wrong parcel , lie
had

already

expended

considerable

time,

effort

and

money

i r.

planning his house on Parcel 2.
Reformation of Plaintiff's deed to add the land on Parcel 2
containing the driveway would necessarily result in subtracting
that

amount of

them

to

lose

land

from

a unique

Bradshawsf

property
14

and

property,

thereby

substantially

causing

prejudicing

their rights.

POINT II: THE CONTRACT
REFRACTORIES
WRONGFUL AND
ARISING FROM
Defendants
injunction.

Bradshaw

BETWEEN BRADSHAWS AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN
WAS ENFORCEABLE, THE INJUNCTION WAS
THE BRADSHAWS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES
THE WRONGFUL INJUNCTION.

are

entitled

to

damages

for

wrongful

The Utah Supreme Court ruled in the case of Mountain

States Telephone and Telegraph v. Atkin, Wright and Miles, 681
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984), that a party is entitled to actual damages
sustained

by

a

wrongful

injunction.

The

court

ruled

that

malicious prosecution is not a prerequisite for recovery on the
bond and it does not require that the lawsuit be brought in bad
faith or connivance.
not

entitled

to

If the Court finally determines Grahns were

the

damages as a result

injunction,

Bradshaws

of the injunction.

are

entitled

t:

Based on the evidence

received by the Court at trial, Bradshaws are entitled to damagr--;
as a result of the Court granting a temporary
preliminary

injunction

prohibiting

them

from

restraining an;;
proceeding

witt

building their Home.
The
Bradshaws
The

facts

Court

erroneously

held

that

the

and Rocky Mountain Refractories
showed

that

there

was

an

contract

betwee:.

was not enfcr.:eabl-:.

offer,

acceptance,

anu

consideration all of which gave rise to an enforceable agreement.
Rocky Mountain Refractories agreed to provide their produce
which was a special insulated aggregate to be added to concrete
to build the Bradshaws1 home.

Rocky Mountain Refractories agreeJ
15

to provide this aggregate on the condition Bradshaws were the
first to use this product in this area.

As consideration for the

agreement the Bradshaws would allow Rocky Mountain Refractories
use the home as a model for testing and marketing purposes.
Craig Ostler, Vice President of Rocky Mountain Refractories,
testified the home would be ideal for these purposes due to its
unique design and location.
Because

of

the

Grahns1

complaint

and

the

injunctions

Bradshaws were not able to begin their home and comply with the
conditions to the contract.

Bradshaws are therefore entitled to

damages as a result of wrongful injunction.
CONCLUSION
The Court erred when it granted reformation of the contract
for the sale of Parcel 1.

The Defendants Bradshaw were bona fide

purchasers without notice, either actual or constructive, which
cut

off

contract.

any

right

the Grahns had

for reformation

of their

To allow the Grahns the reformation of their contract

substantially prejudices Defendants1 Bradshaw's rights as a bona
fide purchaser which this Court should not allow. Therefore this
Court should reverse the lower Court's ruling of reformation and
grant rescission and allow Bradshaw damages.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1989.

JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON

^r^tM—
Russell S. Walker
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Bradshaw
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 2£>

day of July, 1989, I

caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant Gregory to be served upon each of the following by
placing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

John S. Adams
Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe
Sports Mall Office Plaza
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Jeffrey K. Woodbury
2677 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Allen Sims
#8 East Broadway, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84113]

(WSru^C

WBK\G\GRAHN.BR3

17

ADDENDUM
These

Appellants

adopt

by

reference

contained in the brief of Appellant Gregory.

the

Addendum

